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ABSTRACT 
 
The images of devastation and the stories of misery in Aceh during and after the 
December 2004 tsunami, which had dominated the national and international media for 
weeks, confronted us with our weaknesses in times of disaster. This lead us to the fact 
that although disasters are as old as the history of mankind, we are still struggling with 
the question: what is to be done with disasters? This paper is a small part of the struggle. As 
a literature survey, it aims to provide a systematic overview on various important issues 
and debates on efforts in understanding and managing disaster. This paper is organized in 
two parts. The first part deals with the various theoretical aspects of disaster study such 
as definitional debates of disaster, classification of calamities, and some themes (risk, 
vulnerability, ageing, gender) that are important in understanding disasters. The second 
part examines various aspects of efforts in managing disasters. It discusses themes such as 
the components of disaster management and the way it has been done at different levels 
and in different countries.  
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PART I. STUDYING DISASTERS 
 
 
1. UNDERSTANDING CALAMITIES 
 
Experiences, observations, and interpretations of calamities are as old as humanity’s 
endeavours to survive. Inquiries on aspects of calamities and societies under stress have 
also been taken for decades. Throughout the twentieth century the studies of disasters 
have developed extensively in various terms such as the themes and geographical areas 
covered, theoretical frameworks used, varieties of academic disciplines involved, 
activities conducted, and results published. Research groups and individual researchers 
from different disciplines, nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, and activists 
from different interest groups as well as governmental institutions from different 
countries are among other elements which have ensured the further development of 
disaster studies.  
 
Nevertheless, the efforts to study, mitigate, respond to, and recover from calamities are 
often still hindered by a lack of coherency in the disaster field. As will be discussed later, 
the scientific community is still divided in dealing with disaster as an object of inquiry. 
For instance, some researchers concentrate on the environmental aspects of disaster, 
while others look at the social aspects of it. In addition, it is often complicated to 
communicate their work to each other because different studies use different theoretical 
tools. Seemingly simple questions such as “what is a disaster?” will therefore lead to rich 
theoretical debates and contestations. 
 
These theoretical debates and contestations are inseparable from the policies, programs, 
actions, and activism in the disaster field. Either implicitly or explicitly, the theoretical 
frameworks underlie the practical activities. We need to be aware about how calamities 
are perceived in certain policies, programs or actions in order to understand (and be 
critical about) why they do what they do. If we want to join the disaster field then it is 
crucial to clarify our own perception on calamities, since this perception will be one of 
the frames in setting up our work.  
 
From the point of view of social science, disasters have been investigated for more than 
eight decades. Throughout this period, various themes and concepts have emerged and 
led to on-going debates. Until recently, social scientists in the field of disaster were still 
unable to reach consensus on the definition of disaster. Why is it difficult to reach 
definitional consensus of disaster? According to Oliver-Smith (1999:19), this is caused by 
the external variability and internal complexity of disaster.   
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In his view, external variability of disaster refers to  
(1) the wide range of physical agents which can trigger calamities. For example: a 
sudden and catastrophic movement of a part of the Earth’s surface (earthquake), 
extreme high waves which are caused by rapid displacement of water in a lake or 
the sea on a massive scale (tsunami), or the decline in the quality of an 
environment (pollution), etcetera.; and  
(2) the various impacts of such calamities, ranging from immediate destruction and 
death because of an earthquake to gradual deterioration of life condition and 
destitution in a famine.  
 
Consequently, external variability alone has already made it difficult for analysts “… to 
establish a set of common definitional characteristics that can encompass the vast array 
of phenomena that generate and occur in disaster” (Oliver- Smith 1999: 20).  
Box 1. Definitions of Disasters 
 
1. “The term disaster constitutes a set of family resemblances rather than conforming to 
a minimum list of definitional criteria. The concept has ’blurred edges,’ as 
Wittgenstein says, but the inexactness of a definition hardly makes it unusable” 
(Oliver-Smith 1999: 20). 
2. “Disaster is a severe, relatively sudden, and unexpected disruption of normal structural 
arrangements within a social system over which the system has no firm control” 
(Barton 1974 as cited in Nashreen 2004: 1). 
3. “Disaster is also viewed as a mental construct imposed upon experience. This is because 
to understand disaster, knowing the number of deaths, value of property destroyed, or 
the decrease in per capita income is not sufficient. The symbolic component requires 
knowledge of the sense of vulnerability, the adequacy of available explanation, and the 
society’s imagery of death and destruction” (Barkun 1977 as cited in Nashreen 2004: 1). 
4. “A disaster occurs when a significant number of vulnerable people experience a hazard 
and suffer severe damage and/or disruption of their livelihood system in such a way that 
recovery is unlikely without external aid” (Blaikie et al 1994: 21). 
5. “A crisis situation that outstrips the capacity of a society to cope with” (Anderson and 
Woodrow 1993: 133). 
6. “An event, concentrated in time and space, in which a community undergoes severe 
danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social 
structure is disrupted and the fulfilment of all or some of the essential functions of the 
society is prevented” (United Nations Disaster Relief Office/UNDRO as cited in 
McGuire 2003: slide 17) 
7. A serious disruption of the functioning of community or a society causing widespread 
human, material, economic, or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the 
affected community or society to cope using its own resources (International Strategy 
for Disaster Reduction/ISDR 2004). 
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Internal complexity of disaster refers to different perceptions, interpretations, 
experiences, needs and goals of the actors involved in, and affected by, a crisis situation. 
These differences intersect in the theoretical and practical aspects of the disaster field 
and cause fragmentation, which can lead to miscommunication, in coordination or 
conflicting ideas and interests. 
 
In this section, four definitional debates of disaster will be discussed below. 
 
(1) Objectivity–subjectivity debate 
Is disaster an objectively identifiable phenomenon (a set of physical impacts) or a 
subjective, socially constructed process (a set of socially constructed perceptions)? 
Description of a disaster usually includes the material loss and casualties. For some 
analysts and practitioners, these physical impacts, which can be identified and 
calculated, are the main parts of the definition of disaster. But others have said that 
the impact of a disaster is a relative matter, which depends on the interpretation of 
each affected group. For example, the material losses in New Orleans, which were 
caused by hurricane Katrina, could be objectively identified. Different groups (for 
example, the poor and the better off) will, however, experience the (material) loss 
differently according to their subjective interpretation. At this point, as was 
mentioned above, some experts emphasize the objective physical impacts and others 
emphasize the subjective interpretations of affected groups.   
 
(2) The natural environmental–social location debate   
Are disasters located in the natural environment or in society? Is an earthquake in an 
unpopulated area a disaster, or does it become a disaster only if it affects the (human) 
population? In this debate, some experts focus on physical agents (e.g., earthquake, 
hurricane, etc.) in their definition of disaster and explain ”why a disaster takes 
place?”,
1
 while others explain “what a disaster does?” and thus, focus on community 
perceptions and response including organizational involvement in defining a disaster.  
 
(4) Nonroutine–socially embedded debate 
Are disasters “nonroutine” or socially embedded phenomena? Disasters are often 
portrayed as unusual, destabilizing, causing disruption, and beyond people’s ordinary, 
routine, daily realities. Nevertheless, for those who live in areas which are regularly 
exposed to geophysical extremes (earthquake, hurricane, flood, drought, etc.) 
measures to deal with calamities are embedded in their day-to-day life. These at-risk 
communities adapt the architecture of their houses, the agricultural system, and the 
arrangement of their social security systems, or even relocate their settlement 
according to the risks that they run in their natural environment. In this case, the 
risk of hazards is considered to be “an aspect of the environment with which local 
cultures will reach permanent accommodation so that ‘a culture of disaster’ develops” 
(Bankhoff 2003: 159).    
 
(5) Event–process debate  
Is disaster a physical event or more a function of ongoing social orders, human-
environment relations and historical structural processes? Initially, disasters are 
                                               
1
This is also called “hazard paradigm”. 
The SMERU Research Institute, December 2007 4 
regarded as an abnormal, hazardous, geophysical, or meteorological event. According 
to this perspective, disaster has a limited temporal existence, an identifiable 
beginning and end. Disasters are also regarded as events by those primarily interested 
in human behavior. This perspective emphasizes people’s responses towards radically 
or long term changing environmental conditions. The inquiry will focus on what 
people do in the series of stages such as: preparedness, mitigation, relief, and recovery. 
Here too, the responses are regarded as having limited temporal existence and an 
identifiable beginning and cessation.  
 
Nevertheless, more and more social scientists (especially geographers and 
anthropologists), share the idea that disasters are not merely events, but are “… 
considered to be primarily about process in which hazardous events represent moments of 
catharsis along a continuum whose origins lie buried in the past and the outcomes extend 
into the future. It is the pre- disaster conditions that mainly affect a society’s ability to 
cope with hazard …” (Bankhoff 2003:157).  
 
In addition to those definitional debates, disasters are also approached differently in 
various studies. Bankoff (2003) categorized three approaches according to three 
disciplines in social science.  
• Geographers: Understand disasters as the product of natural phenomena such as land 
slide, tidal waves, flood, etcetera. Nature is, therefore, seen as having the principal 
active role, while human systems are its passive agents. This approach assesses 
population as to whether they are “at risk”, which is determined by the degree of 
hazard and their level of vulnerability.   
• Sociologists: On the other hand, sociologists focus almost exclusively on the 
structures, functions, and activities of formal organizations and the impact of disasters 
upon them and generally give the environment only a minor role. They pay special 
attention to new or emergent groups that arise as a consequence of crisis situations. 
The main issue here is whether the unit of analysis should be the social psychology of 
the individual or the social organization of the group. 
• Anthropologists: Use a more holistic approach. They view disasters as integral parts 
of both the environmental and human system. They are the result of a process that 
involves a destructive agent and a vulnerable population. The unit of analysis is 
community, town, region or localized ethnic enclave. The focus of the study is 
primarily on the developments that make populations vulnerable and the practices 
they have evolved to cope with the disadvantageous conditions.  
 
Natural hazards do happen regularly in many places, but when do we speak of a disaster? 
When does a problematic situation—such as floods which occur every wet season in 
many neighborhoods of Jakarta—become a disaster? Frerks et al (1999: 7–9) explained 
three kinds of criteria to establish the thresholds of disaster. 
 
A first set of criteria considers a situation disastrous when external assistance is needed 
to cope with it … many countries have centuries of experience dealing with disaster 
and, until today, most effects of disasters are addressed by local means. One trend in 
disaster management stipulates that we only speak of a disaster when the local capacity 
to deal with it falls short and external help is needed. One may argue, however, that this 
criterion denies the experience of people that are undergoing a disaster but managing to 
cope with it. 
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A second set of criteria to establish the threshold of disaster is more institutional and 
formal. These imply that an emergency has to be declared formally by the authorities of 
particular country or by international relief organizations. The disadvantage of such an 
institutional criterion is that some regimes simply do not declare an emergency 
irrespectively of the condition on the ground. This is because of consideration of 
international prestige or because they want to continue repression or killing of their 
opponent unnoticed by the world at large.  
 
Moreover, it will be complicated if the authority of the stricken country refuses to 
formally declare an emergency while the international relief organizations do. 
 
[The third set of criteria] … is a quantitative criterion to establish whether there is an 
emergency or not. In this case, the number of victims (deaths, injured, evacuated) or 
total damage caused is used to determine whether an event can be called a disaster. 
Quantitative criteria, however, vary by country and by organization. Quantification 
depends on the quality of the sources, the reporting, and the analysis, as well as the 
possibility of access to disaster areas. In many situations it is difficult to acquire a reliable 
picture as the population is at drift, lines of communication have been destroyed, and 
contacts made impossible. Most empirical situations are characterized by instability, 
chaos, fluidity, and transition so that observers may find it difficult to put such 
conditions in categories amenable to public policy. 
 
Although they are still debatable, these three criteria can be used to distinguish between 
problematic and disastrous or emergency situations. There is, however, no absolute and 
universal set of criteria to determine whether a disaster will occur or not in a country. 
What is important is to apply these criteria in ways (and combinations) that can prevent 
postponed actions and delayed relief so that unnecessary losses (both human lives and 
properties) can be avoided.  
 
 
2. CLASSIFYING CALAMITIES 
 
It has been discussed formerly that calamities are many and varied. We therefore need to 
have a more systematic categorization of the term. The categorization can be established 
as follows:  
 
(1) According to the nature of the hazardous event:  
• Natural disasters: geological hazards (e.g., earthquakes, tsunamis/seismic sea 
waves, volcanic eruptions, mud flows), atmospheric hazards (hurricanes, tropical 
cyclones or typhoons, tornadoes), hydrological hazards (e.g., river or coastal 
floods) 
• Man-made or human induced disasters (e.g., heavy environmental pollution, 
industrial and technological disasters, traffic accidents, epidemics, fires)  
• Armed conflict related disasters (e.g., war, genocide, social violence) 
 
(2) According to the duration of the hazardous event: 
• Acute disasters: rapid-onset event with immediate destruction and death 
(volcanoes eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, floods, hurricanes). These types of 
disasters— especially if they are also major ones—usually elicit empathy more 
easily and, therefore, attract a quick response and support. Moreover, its 
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“suddenness” commonly attracts media attention (it is a good ‘breaking news’ 
item) so that it is more likely to get adequate coverage. 
• Chronic disasters: slow-onset process with impacts not perceived or experienced 
physically for a longer period (drought, famines, environmental breakdowns, 
pollution, toxic exposures). Frerks et al (1999: 10) wrote that “Slow-onset 
disasters are also referred as ‘creeping’ or ‘lingering’ disasters”. In contrast to 
earthquakes, for example, famines develop slowly and do not cause immediate 
deaths. In principle this provides the opportunity to take timely measures in the 
field of preparedness, prevention, and mitigation. Reality, however, tells us a 
different story. A problem is that it may remain ambiguous for a long time as to 
whether the situation will really turn into a disaster. As observed by author 
Field: “the dividing line, if there is one, between famine and nonfamine is so 
blurred, that on the margins, the existence of famine is a matter of 
interpretation” (Field 1993: 264). This affects a timely and pro-active response 
enormously. The aid therefore, arrives far too often after the worst is over.  
 
(3) According to the extent of impact (the potential of the disaster to cause damage to 
human life and property): 
• Major disasters, which have wider impacts and higher intensity of damage 
(tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruptions, pandemic). 
• Minor disasters, which have localized impacts and less intense damage (e.g., fire 
accidents, landslides, avalanches). 
 
Although it is useful to have this categorization in mind to understand calamities, in 
reality most disasters are much more complex and overlapping. They have multiple 
triggers and impacts. Famine, for example, can be related to several causes such as public 
policy failures, economic processes, inequality, food availability, drought, or war. In 
addition, different types of disasters may reinforce one another. The earthquake in 
Pakistan (October 2005), might be followed by an epidemic because of long-term harsh 
living conditions, lack of sanitary facilities and health services.     
 
 
3. CONNECTING CALAMITIES TO SOME IMPORTANT THEMES   
 
Disaster risks 
Disaster risk refers to “the expected numbers of lives lost, persons injured, property 
damaged and economic activity disrupted due to a particular natural phenomenon” 
(UNDRO 1991 as cited in Frerks 1999: 11), or, “the magnitude of probable future 
damage and loss associated with the occurrence of hazards of natural and anthropogenic 
origin” (Lavell 2005). 
 
People perceive and assess risk differently, within the range of opportunities available to 
them. This difference is influenced or even determined by various factors such as gender, 
age (life stage), socioeconomic position, ethnicity, traditions, etcetera. Therefore in the 
perception and assessment of risk, cultural and social aspects are very important. It is 
assumed that “… societies selectively choose risks for attention. This reflects prevailing 
images and representations, values and beliefs about social institutions, nature and moral 
behaviour.” (Frerks 1999: 11).  
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The acknowledgement of the importance of the cultural aspect allows us to understand 
what might be erroneously seen as “fatalistic attitudes” of some communities in facing a 
crisis or disastrous situation. In his study on cultures of disaster in the Philippines, 
Bankoff (2002) argued that in the principle of bahala na, which is usually understood as 
simply fatalism (“leave it to fate”), there is a sense of risk-taking. “Bahala is also about 
courage and daring and a sense of finely calculated assessment of the odds”.  
 
The social aspect of risk perception and assessment includes differences according to the 
position in the power relationship. Studies have demonstrated contradictive or even 
conflicting perceptions and assessments of risk between local populations and 
authorities. Medical experts and authorities held contradictory views to the local 
population on the radiological effects on health in and around the atoll of Mururoa 
(some 1,000 km from Tahiti) where the French had conducted nuclear-weapon tests. 
“Where the experts denied that there was any risk or health effect, the population felt at 
risk and experienced all types of health problems” (Frerks et al 1999: 12, see also 
http://www-ns.iaea.org/appraisals/mura-fang.htm). In the Indonesian context, Laksono’s 
study on perceptions of the hazards of Mount Merapi showed the conflict between local 
communities’ perceptions which are colored by tradition and custom and the 
government’s assessment which is determined by economic and political considerations. 
He argued that “The real point of this comparison is that all such evaluations are 
ultimately subjective to some extent, the particular bias varying from case to case 
depending upon who makes the evaluation and for what purpose. … Because of the 
differences in power between a national government and a tiny village, it more often 
happens that the latter is made aware of its subjectivity than the former” (Laksono 1988: 
197). 
 
Vulnerability to disaster 
In the disaster field, the vulnerability approach has, since the 1980s, challenged the 
dominance of the technical approach and intervention which focuses on predicting 
hazards and modifying their impacts.  
 
Terry Cannon persuasively argues that while hazards are natural, disasters are not. Social 
processes generate unequal exposure to risk by making some people more prone to 
disaster than others, and these inequalities are largely a function of the power relations 
operative in every society. Critical to discerning the nature of disasters, then, is an 
appreciation of the ways in which human systems place people at risk in relation to each 
other and to their environment—a relationship that can best be understood in terms of 
an individual’s, a household’s, a community’s, or a society’s vulnerability. (Hilhorst and 
Bankoff 2004: 2)  
 
Thus, vulnerability to disaster is “the extent to which an individual, community, sub-
group, structure, service or geographic area is likely to be damaged or disrupted by the 
impact of disaster hazard” (Kotze and Holloway 1996 as cited in Frerks et al 1999: 13). 
 
In order to understand the concept of vulnerability to disasters, we need to pay attention 
to several issues: First, vulnerability, “… is not a property of social groups or individual, 
but it is embedded in complex social relation and processes” (Hilhorst and Bankoff 2004: 
5), and therefore it is specific. This view discourages the attempt to establish a general 
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chart of vulnerability which can be applied to anybody, anywhere. In analyzing 
vulnerability to disasters we need to establish the processes within different levels. Here, 
the specific local or regional context is very important. 
 
Second, vulnerability to disaster is dynamic and fluid. It reflects changing social, cultural, 
political and economic conditions over the course of time. As noted by Hilhorst and 
Bankoff (2004: 6): “Vulnerability changes through time in unpredictable ways and in 
varying directions: increasing, accelerating, oscillating, concentrating or diffusing. It 
varies with the interplay of three different time frames: long-term, short-term and 
cyclical change.”   
 
Third, “Vulnerability is not just concerned with the present or the future but is equally, 
and intimately, a product of the past. … History reveals that vulnerability may be 
centuries in the making: societies and destructive agents are mutually constituted and 
embedded in natural and social systems as unfolding processes over time” (Hilhorst and 
Bankoff 2004: 3–4). Consequently, the lack of an adequate historical perspective on the 
roots and causes of disasters often hinders the effort to adequately analyze the 
construction known as vulnerability to disaster. 
 
Fourth, vulnerability is especially about people, namely their perceptions and knowledge. 
People’s ideas on the roots of (their) vulnerability to disaster determine the solutions 
they chose.  
 
Three different approaches towards the roots and causes of vulnerability and types of 
solutions can be distinguished:  
(1) The approach that views vulnerability in terms of the risk of (physical) exposure to 
hazardous conditions takes as its starting point the idea that nature and natural 
hazards are the causes of people’s vulnerability, although it acknowledges that not all 
people are equally susceptible to harm by the same hazards. The measurement of this 
vulnerability usually emphasizes factors such as the intensity, magnitude, rapidity of 
onset, duration and frequency of hazardous events, which are reflected in the amount 
of damage. In other words, people’s vulnerability is seen as determined by their 
proximity to the threats (Heijmans 2001: 2). This approach typically offers 
technological mitigation strategies, such as (better) systems and equipment to 
monitor fire and seismic activity, to forecast weather, to control water, etcetera. 
 
(2) The approach that views vulnerability as a social construction focuses on structural 
factors which make individuals or groups of people susceptible to harm by external 
shocks (e.g., geophysical extremes, epidemic diseases). In this approach, factors 
such as inequality (based on gender, economic position, age, or race), 
marginalization, poverty, access to social protection and security, etc. generate, 
shape or exacerbate people’s vulnerability. These structural factors, which can 
enable or constrain people to avoid, mitigate and cope with hazards, existed before 
the hazardous events take place. They can, therefore, be seen from an ex ante 
perspective as predisposing factors. From an ex post perspective, these structural 
factors are inseparable from the outcomes, in the sense that they can enable or 
constrain people in their recovery. This approach usually suggests mitigation 
strategies that advocate longer term transformations of socio-political-economic 
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structures, such as poverty alleviation, social security schemes, or gender 
empowerment (Webb and Harinarayan 1999: 292; Benda-Beckmann and Benda-
Beckmann 1994: 23; Brooks 2003: 4). 
 
(3) The approach that points out the high protection and mitigation costs as crucial 
contributions to people’s vulnerability. In this view, the degree of vulnerability is 
determined by the ability to pay the protection and mitigation costs. Consequently, 
the poorest are the most vulnerable. This approach brings to the fore financial 
solutions to reduce people’s vulnerability, such as various forms of insurance, 
financial assistance to build up assets, calamity funds, etcetera. (cf. Heijmans 2001: 2; 
Boyce 2000: 257–8). 
 
It is important to underline that these approaches to causes of vulnerability are not 
mutually exclusive and not always explicitly stated in the analysis. In fact, many studies 
pay attention to a combination of issues that have been highlighted by these views (for 
example, Waite 2000; Heijmans 2004; Webb and Harinarayan 1999). Nevertheless, the 
interplay of structural factors and agency is crucial in the analysis of many recent studies 
of vulnerability (Delor and Hubert 2000; Watts and Bohle 1993; Wisner 1993). 
 
The intertwinement of risk, vulnerability, and disaster 
In some studies (Blaikie et al 2004; Frerks et al 1999; Asian Disaster Reduction 
Center/ADRC), natural phenomena such as earthquakes, floods or landslides are 
referred as “hazards” which might occur without automatically resulting in disasters. For 
example, a tornado that takes place in an unpopulated desert would not necessarily 
trigger a disaster because it does not affect (human) population and properties. In this 
view “A disaster occurs actually at the interface of hazards and vulnerability” (Frerks et 
al 1999: 11).  
 
In the disaster field, therefore, the concepts of “risk”, “vulnerability,” and “disaster” are 
often perceived as closely related. In their book At Risk, “Blaikie et al argue that hazards, 
vulnerability and risk are all uniquely intertwined in the development of death and 
destruction from disasters” (Cyr 2005). Frerks et al (1999: 11) similarly noted that “The 
risk that a disaster evolves, is the outcome of the combination of such a phenomenon 
with the vulnerability of the population, communities, households, or individuals that 
are affected.”   
 
The intertwinement of those concepts has been explained in formulas such as: 
 
Disaster = Risk + Vulnerability 
                                                            (Blaikie et al 2004) 
 
Disaster risk = function (hazard, exposure, vulnerability) 
                                          (Asian Disaster Reduction Center) 
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4. CONNECTING CALAMITIES TO SPECIFIC SOCIAL GROUPS 
 
As was discussed above, recent research concerning crisis and disaster raises the question 
whether crisis is “an objectively identifiable phenomenon or a subjective, socially 
constructed process.” This debate puts emphasis on the subjectivity of crisis that brings to 
the fore “the multiple perspectives of different affected groups” (Oliver-Smith 1999). 
The experience of hardship in a crisis situation is understood as a relative matter that 
corresponds to the heterogeneity of the affected. Accordingly, disaster risk and 
vulnerability to disaster are differentially distributed between and within societies. Efforts 
to survive, then, are performed within constraints and opportunities or exclusion and 
inclusion processes, according to the intersection of various lines of social differentiation 
such as gender, ethnicity, citizenship status, economic position, and age. In this view, it 
is important to connect calamities to specific affected groups and it is challenging to 
analyze differential vulnerability and the capacity to cope among those who are afflicted.  
 
A number of groups in the population are often seen as the most vulnerable namely, 
the frail elderly, children, the chronically ill, women (and girls), members of 
subordinated cultural and racial groups, undocumented residents, and the poor. These 
groups are regarded as deserving special attention because of their specific needs 
(limitations) which are determined by their specific (socioeconomic and cultural) 
position in the given society. This section will further discuss women (and girls) and 
the elderly as examples of “social groups with specific needs”. 
 
Women (and girls) 
Fordham (2004: 176) argues that various researches demonstrated the importance of 
recognizing women’s and girls’ greater vulnerability in crisis situations. This vulnerability 
can be related to a number of issues: 
 
(1) Women’s limited opportunity and the gender division of labor 
According to Fordham (2004: 176-177), “… women, as a group, have fewer 
opportunities than men, as a group, … They more frequently occupy a position of 
dependence on other persons for at least part of their subsistence.” Moreover,  
 
The gendered division of labour in households and in the global economy makes 
most women less able than most men to control economic resources mitigating the 
effects of disasters. Their high levels of predisaster poverty, secondary status in the 
labour force, extensive informal sector, lack of land rights, and extensive domestic 
responsibilities clearly make them economically vulnerable long before a natural 
disaster occurs. (Enarson 2000: viii)  
 
In many cultural contexts, patriarchal structural limitations even deny women’s 
rights and their ability to pursue equality of opportunity. Gender stereotypes and 
gender related norms and values—for example, the rules and practices of seclusion of 
women in some South Asian countries—have substantially reduced women’s work 
opportunity. 
 
(2) Women’s multiple burden  
Even in a noncrisis situation, studies have revealed women’s multiple burdens as care 
giver, producer and community actors. “They often have obligations to others that 
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compromise their ability to obtain what they need for themselves. Throughout the 
world, to varying degrees, women still occupy a (usually invisible) triple role: 
reproduction, production and community management/activism” (Fordham 2004: 
177). These roles can make it harder for women to choose and protect their interests. 
In her report on ‘Gender and Natural Disasters,’ Enarson (2000: viii) identifies that 
in emergencies “women’s workload increases dramatically.” They often have to 
undertake income generating activities (either as a sole earner or as a co-earner), be 
involved in emergency response, carry out household duties, and have expanded 
responsibility for care.   
 
(3) Women’s overlooked particular needs and under-representation 
With regards to the differentiation between the “public/men–private/women 
domain”, it can be said that disaster mitigation, response and relief are often located 
in the “public domain”. Those involved in these activities are mostly men. 
Consequently, the male-dominated, official disaster management might overlook 
women’s particular needs (Fordham 1998). In cultural contexts where it is considered 
inappropriate or even shameful for women to be in public spheres without a 
chaperone, being out alone in a relief or rescue center—among many strangers—can 
cause fear and stigma. In addition, in this kind of environment, women and girls may 
face greater risk of sexual harassment.  
 
As Fordham (2004: 177) noted:  
 
Male disaster practitioners typically have little awareness of women’s particular 
sanitary and privacy needs, for example, and gender-blind decisions on the siting of 
latrines and washing facilities in relief camps can increase women’s anxiety, add to 
their work load and increase the risk of sexual harassment and violence … Despite 
their often widespread presence in lower status positions, women are under-
represented in positions of power and responsibility on pre-and postdisaster 
decision-making committees and organizations. … Thus, women are potentially 
vulnerable throughout the disaster process. 
 
Ariyabandu (2000: 4) mentioned cases where women and female children in particular 
were more vulnerable to extreme events in comparison to men.  
 
[In Bangladesh] work opportunities for women in many areas are virtually 
nonexistent. Therefore when hit by disasters and displaced, for survival many 
families are forced to take beggars bowl … The situation is worst for women who do 
not have a male relative in the family (husband, a brother or a grown up son). There 
are numerous accounts of single women affected by disasters whose children are 
never sent to school but for begging for family survival. The factors related to 
restricted mobility do not allow or encourage women to move to unknown 
destinations on their own in search of employment. Being illiterate, the skills 
women possess too are limited and basic. 
 
Elderly  
In ageing studies, the elderly are often defined as those who are 65 years and older. This 
group is far from homogenous, and therefore can be expected to have a wide range of 
reactions to emergencies and various needs for assistance. Experts in disaster relief, 
however, regard the elderly as a vulnerable group that should receive special attention. 
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Older people’s vulnerability to disasters can be caused by their decreased physical and 
mental capacities such as: 
 
(1) Sensory deprivation 
Older person’s sense of smell, touch, vision, and hearing are likely to be less acute 
than that of the general population causing potential difficulties in emergencies. A 
diminished sense of smell could make an older person less likely to identify spoiled 
food. A hearing loss may cause an older person not to hear what is said in the noisy 
environment of  Disaster Relief Center/DRC. 
 
(2) Delayed response 
Some older persons may respond slowly to calls for disaster relief for reasons including 
age-related slowing of cognitive and motor activity, difficulties in comprehending 
radio or television broadcast under difficult listening conditions, and impaired 
psycho-motor ability caused by medications. 
 
(3) Chronic illness and dietary considerations 
Arthritis may prevent an elder from standing in line. Medications can cause 
confusion or a greater susceptibility to problems such as dehydration. Memory 
disorder can cause communication problems, as can neglect of special dietary 
considerations. Emergency food rations, for example, need to be low in sodium for 
the many older adults who suffer from hypertension.  
 
(4) Multiple loss effect 
“…many seniors have lost of their spouse, income, home and/or physical capabilities. 
The compounding effect may make disaster recovery difficult. Intense attachment to 
specific items of property often adds to their tensions.” (Oriol 1999: 26) 
 
(5) Hyper/hypothermia 
Extremes of heat or cold have marked effects upon older persons. This becomes 
critical in disasters that close down furnaces or air conditioners. “… Persons seventy-
five years or older are five times more likely to die of hypothermia than those under 
that age.” (Oriol 1999: 27)  
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PART II. MANAGING DISASTERS  
 
 
5. DISASTER MANAGEMENT   
 
Disasters mostly bring misery and loss. These are things that nobody wishes to be 
confronted with. Hazardous agents (e.g. earthquake, tsunami, volcanic eruption, etc.) 
therefore have to be assessed and counteracted, vulnerabilities to hazards have to be 
reduced, emergencies have to be responded to and damages have to be recovered. In 
other words, disasters have to be managed, as we want to avoid or mitigate misery and 
losses.  
 
Nevertheless, managing disasters is as complex as understanding disasters themselves. 
“[It] requires a comprehensive approach that accounts for the causes of a society’s 
vulnerability to disaster. Not only must a comprehensive strategy be articulated, the 
political and economic will must be created to sustain the new policies” (Freeman et al 
2003: 1). According to ISDR (2004: n.p.), disaster (risk) management is: 
 
The systemic process of using administrative decisions, organization, operational skills 
and capacities to implement policies, strategies, and coping capacities of the society and 
communities to lessen the impact of natural hazards and related environmental and 
technological disasters. This comprises all forms of activities, including structural and 
nonstructural measures to avoid (prevention) or to limit (mitigation and preparedness) 
adverse effects of hazards. 
 
 
6. COMPONENTS OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
 
In the literature, the important components of disaster management are classified into 
two phases namely, the pre- and postdisaster phases. Freeman et al (2003)
2
 argued that a 
comprehensive disaster management plan should consist of six components: 
 
6.1 Predisaster Component 
 
Risk Identification, includes activities such as: 
 
• Hazards assessment, which “identifies the probable location and severity of dangerous 
natural phenomena and the likelihood of their occurring within a specific time 
period in a given area.” (Freeman et al 2003: 1). This assessment will rely on (and be 
influenced by) the availability of scientific information such as “geologic, geomorphic 
and soil maps; climate and hydrological data; and topographic maps, aerial 
photographs, and satellite imagery.” The assessment also needs historical information 
in the form of written reports or oral accounts of long-term inhabitants of particular 
hazard-prone areas. In order to maximize the use of the available information, a 
successful assessment has to be backed-up by scientific teams trained to evaluate the 
data.  
 
                                               
2
 Freeman’s report is the main source of the discussion on disaster management components in this paper. 
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• Vulnerability studies, which aim to estimate “the physical, social, and economic 
consequences that result from the occurrence of a natural phenomenon of given 
severity” (Freeman et al 2003: 2) There are three vulnerability needs to be examined; 
namely, (1) physical vulnerability that refers to the impact of particular hazards on 
buildings, infrastructure, and agriculture; (2) social vulnerability that refers to the 
impact of particular hazards on vulnerable groups such as the poor, women, children, 
elderly, etcetera. An examination of social vulnerability is concerned with issues such 
as public awareness of risk, the ability of groups/communities to deal with calamities 
and institutional structures that can help them; and (3) economic vulnerabilities that 
refers to the impact of hazards on economic assets and processes.  
 
• Risk analysis, which “integrates information from hazards assessment and 
vulnerability studies in the form of an estimate of the probabilities of expected loss 
for a given hazardous event.” (Freeman et al 2003: 3) This kind of analysis is usually 
costly and time consuming. In the United States and Europe, the private sector 
(insurance companies) has invested in the efforts of risk modelling. The private 
sector will, however, only come out with this kind of initiative if there is a guarantee 
that the investment can lead to the development of insurance markets. In 
(developing) countries where the insurance markets are still limited, risk 
identification studies can be conducted with support from international partnerships. 
This kind of support has also been provided to Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Mitigation, “refers to policies and activities that reduce an area’s vulnerability to damage 
from future disasters.” (Freeman et al 2003: 4–6) Mitigation includes two types of 
measures, namely: 
 
• Structural mitigation measures aim to reduce the impact of hazards on people and 
buildings by using engineering and technical measures such as dams, dykes, special 
design of transportation systems, soil analysis. This type of mitigation, however, is not 
always free of problems. The structural flood mitigation in Vietnam shows that the 
project only provides short-term protection and in the long term it even makes the 
problems worse. In this case, the flood control system has exacerbated rather than 
reduced the extent of flooding as the sediment deposit in river channels has raised 
the height of the river channel and strained the dykes’ systems. In addition, over-
confidence in structural mitigation measures can give people a false sense of security. 
 
• Nonstructural mitigation measures are “nonengineered activities that reduce the 
intensity of hazard or vulnerability to hazards.” (Freeman et al 2003: 6) These 
measures include activities such as land use planning, building codes, public 
education and training, etcetera. and are generally less costly than the structural 
ones, therefore they are particularly appropriate for countries with less financial 
capacity. In addition, the successful nonstructural mitigation measures are often those 
that are well integrated into development programs. 
 
Risk Transfer, refers to the involvement of insurance companies in financing the high 
costs of recovery and rehabilitation after a disaster occurrence. The use of insurer as the 
primary risk transfer tool has advantages such as it encourages loss reduction measures, it 
allows the spreading of risk between parties and reduces the variance of risk for each 
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person. It is also well known, however, that insurance programs are an important 
component of the risk management strategy only in wealthier countries. In poorer 
countries, the role of insurance is very limited in covering the (material) losses caused by 
disasters. It cannot be expected that this situation will change soon as in the poorer 
countries there is also a lack of demand for calamities insurance.  
 
Preparedness, “involves building an emergency response and management capability before a 
disaster occurs.” (Freeman et al 2003: 9) Disaster preparedness includes various activities 
such as: (1) training programs for response personnel; (2) exercises and drills of emergency 
plans; (3) education programs to inform citizens; (4) hazard detection and warning systems; 
(5) identification of evacuation routes and shelters; (6) maintenance of emergency supplies 
and communications systems; (7) establishment of procedures for notifying and mobilizing 
key personnel; and (8) individual household measures such as clearing some spaces in a 
house (e.g. the attic) to make room for belongings in case of a flood.  
 
It is important to note that, unlike the mitigation component that is usually a product of 
national policies, preparedness projects often work on a smaller scale. They focus more 
on the actions and practices of organizations and individuals. One of the inherent 
problems in applying and maintaining disaster preparedness is related to the fact that 
these are ex ante activities. They have to be carried out for events that probably will 
occur but might not. In the case where many years have passed since the last disastrous 
event, and the sense of crisis has decreased, disaster preparedness will be more difficult to 
be maintained. Consequently, outdated plans and warning systems are not unusual. In 
order to deal with this, it is important to conduct continued public awareness programs 
using broadcasting agencies, school activities, community programs, advertising in 
popular events, organizing workshops, etcetera.  
 
6.2 Postdisaster Components 
 
Emergency Response, “refers to actions taken immediately before, during, and after the 
onset of a major disaster or large-scale emergency to minimize the loss of life and harm to 
people and their property and enhance the effectiveness of recovery.” (Freeman et al 
2003: 10–11) This component includes activities such as: (1) hazard detection and 
warning; (2) evacuation of threatened populations; (3) constructing shelters for victims; 
(4) providing emergency medical care; (5) conducting search and rescue operations; and 
(6) provision of emergency water or power supplies, etcetera. The quality of the 
emergency response is certainly influenced by the quality of the planning and training in 
the predisaster phase. In other words, appropriate disaster preparedness will lead to an 
adequate emergency response.   
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Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, “refers to programs that provide longer-term assistance 
for people who have suffered injuries or losses due to a major disaster. The objective is to 
facilitate the return of these communities to their predisaster condition.” (Freeman et al 
2003: 10–11) This component includes activities such as: (1) repairing and 
reconstructing houses, public buildings, community facilities and other important 
infrastructures; and (2) providing livelihood protection throughout the recovery process. 
Ideally, mitigation measures are integrated in reconstruction and rehabilitation programs 
and activities in order to prevent recreating initially vulnerable conditions.  
 
 
7. ACTORS IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT   
 
In the following subsections, disaster management will be distinguished and discussed at 
three different levels (national, local and international levels). This is a “vertical” point 
of view where policies, programs, actions and actors are placed within three scales of geo-
political entities. This paper uses the geo-political categorization because disaster 
management in various countries is commonly structured and organized according to it.  
 
Hilhorst (2004: 52–66) examined disaster management from a “horizontal” perspective, 
and differentiated this field into three social domains that represent different notions, 
discourses, and experiences in the disaster field: 
(1) The domain of science and disaster management with scientists and managers as 
main actors  
(2) The domain of disaster governance with bureaucrats and politicians as main actors  
(3) The domain of local responses with local producers and vulnerable people as main 
actors 
 
The various categories show that disaster management involves a range of (institutional) 
actors who have their own mandates, expertises and instruments. They include:  
(1) The affected communities (victims, vulnerable groups, profiteers, and combatants)  
(2) Central government (ministries, politicians, and bureaucracies) 
(3) Local governments (governmental institutions, politicians, and bureaucracies) 
(4) Local and national organizations (nongovernment organizations), religious groups, 
etc) 
(5) International organizations (humanitarian/relief agencies) 
(6) International communities (bilateral and multilateral co-operations, United Nations) 
(7) Host communities that receive refugees or displaced people 
(8) The media 
 
At the international level, the major organizations in disaster managements include the 
following ones as shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1.  Major Organization in Disaster Management  
Organizations Activities 
Asian Disaster Preparedness Center ADPC Capacity building for preparedness 
Mitigation and response through training 
Technical assistance 
Research and information 
European Community Humanitarian 
Office 
ECHO Humanitarian aid  
Disaster Preparedness Programme (DIP-
ECHO), including human resource 
development, institutional strengthening, 
and low cost technology projects 
Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
OCHA Coordination of international emergency 
response 
Policy development 
Early response and prevention 
Food and Agriculture Organization FAO Global information and early warning 
System for food and agriculture 
Preventive and mitigating activities in 
agriculture  
Preparedness measures and food stocking 
Sustainable rehabilitation of rural 
production system 
United Nations Development Programme UNDP Rehabilitation and preventive activities 
Capacity building, training and planning 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization 
UNESCO Promotion and mobilization of scientific 
knowledge 
Technical assistance in monitoring and 
early warning systems 
Information, training and dissemination 
International mobile warning system for 
volcanic eruptions 
International tsunami warning 
World Bank WB Disaster management facility 
World Food Programme WFP Food emergency aid 
Early warning and preventive measures 
World Health Organization/  
Pan American Health Organization 
WHO/ 
PAHO 
Health care, water and sanitation 
Research, documentation, 
communication, and international 
cooperation 
Disaster documentation center 
World Meteorological Organization  WMO Collection, analysis, and transmission of 
meteorological and hydrological data 
Research, training, and communication 
Source: Frerks et al (1999: 56) 
 
In the practice of disaster management, these categories/actors (both the “vertical” as 
well as the “horizontal” ones) are intertwined. In doing the work, each actor is 
unavoidably influenced or even limited by other actors in the scene. The providers of 
humanitarian assistance for example, have to deal with the needs of the affected 
population, the policies and political decisions of the central and local governments, the 
activities of other relief agencies and the work of the media. Although this 
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intertwinement is unavoidable and vital, it is not always advantageous for the quality of 
disaster management. From reports and media coverage we have also learned about 
conflicting interests and mandates, miscommunication, problems in coordination and 
even distrust among the actors in the disaster management scene, which hampered the 
provision of help and support.  
 
 
 
Box 2. The International History of Relief 
 
The international history of relief starts when, after the Battle of Solferino in 1859, the first 
Societies of the Red Cross were established by Henry Dunant. In 1864, the first Geneva 
Convention, a multilateral agreement on the Red Cross, announced the start of humanitarian 
law and practice. In 1922, the Red Cross Societies established the IFRC (International 
Federation of the Red Cross) later called IFRC-RCS (IFRC and Red Crescent Societies). Until 
today, this organization has a special mandate and status on the basis of international law. 
 
Immediately after the second World War, in 1946, the UN’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF) was 
founded. In 1963, FAO’s World Food Programme (WFP) was established and by 1972 the UN 
established UNDRO (UN Disaster Relief Office) in order to co-ordinate the efforts of disaster 
relief. Presently, 16 different UN agencies have a mandate allowing them to work in emergency 
situation. 
 
The first international NGOs concerned with relief originate from the end of the 19
th
 century, 
usually with a focus on war-torn Europe. Following the second World War the scope and number 
of religious and charitable bodies involved in “overseas” aid work started to grow. This was 
exacerbated since the early 1980s, when due to the problems with relief management many 
disaster relief donor agencies were willing to shift their resources from governments to NGOs. 
This was, among others, related to the fact that according to their mandates, government donor 
agencies should coordinate closely with recipient governments, which often led to problems. 
Many of the governments involved were shown to divert the food aid or other resources towards 
supporting their own military forces or political allies. NGOs had the advantage that they could 
work in situations where international agencies could not justify their presence.  
 
… Besides, nongovernmental organisations were considered more efficient and 
participation-oriented than (international) government agencies. This shifting interest 
of donor governments gave impetus to mushrooming of national and local NGOs. New 
international NGOs emerged in reaction to the practice of older NGOs. An example of 
these is Médecins Sans Frontiéres, that explicitly combines relief work with advocacy 
concerns. Some of the international NGOs have grown in scope where they can be 
found at almost all disaster situations in the developing world. These include Medecins 
Sans Frontieres (MSF), Oxfam, Save the Children Fund, CARE, CONCERN, and 
International Rescue Committee (IRC). (Frerks et al 1999: 54-57) 
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8. DISASTER MANAGEMENT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
The Asian Development Bank provides an example of a National Disaster 
Organizational Structure with important features as follows:  
 
(1) The structure is centered at a National Disaster Council. This body gets the 
mandate from the cabinet and maintains networks and cooperation with 
international assistance.  
 
(2) To implement its tasks, the National Disaster Council has an operational body, 
namely the National Disaster Management Office.  
 
(3) The National Disaster Council has three divisions with specific tasks; namely,  
preparedness/mitigation division, response division, and recovery division. 
 
(4) The preparedness/mitigation division works with: 
• Government departments/ NGOs  
• Provincial disaster committees  
• Local government committees.  
The work of this division is especially conducted in communities.  
 
(5) The response division works with: 
• Operation control group  
• National emergency operations center 
• Government departments/NGOs  
• Provincial disaster committees 
• Local government committees 
The work of this division is mainly in the disaster areas. 
 
(6) The recovery division works with:  
• Technical advisory team 
• Government departments/ NGOs 
• Provincial disaster committees 
The major work of this division is designing and implementing recovery 
programs. 
 
This structure depends on the national government. “There is, however, disagreement 
in the literature regarding the advisability of depending on national government as the 
appropriate foundation for a comprehensive program,” because “…focusing natural 
disaster policy through existing government systems enhances narrow power structures 
and draws away from local concerns and initiatives” (Freeman et al 2003: i). 
Proponents of this view prefer community-based projects and programs that are 
developed by NGOs. Although this way cannot guarantee the quality of risk 
management, it is closer to affected people (thus more likely to capture their needs) 
and can directly empower the local populations (Freeman et al 2003). 
 
Beside the necessity to find a suitable structure, an effective design of a national disaster 
management system also needs to have: 
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(1) An explicit and appropriate national strategy 
Each country has it own specific circumstance that is determined by some factors 
such as of the sociopolitical situation; the geographical condition including the types 
of hazards the country faces; the nature of institutional arrangements of the disaster 
system (e.g., the composition of the parties involved), etcetera. In this regard, each 
country needs to develop strategies that are appropriate for its specific circumstances. 
In order to achieve this, the involvement of various stakeholders, who can bring to 
the fore different perspectives and expertise, is necessary. Nevertheless, it is 
important to recognize that this development might take a longer time (of “trial and 
error”) than a few conferences or workshops, because an appropriate national strategy 
for disaster management is also a result of learned lessons.  
 
(2) Key actors cooperation and coordination 
As mentioned before, disaster management consists of various actors who are 
intertwined with each other. Instead of a “messy” one, the intertwinement needs to 
be articulated in cooperation and coordination. Learning from different national 
disaster systems, Freeman et al (2003: 27–28) argued that:  
 
The most successful systems take advantage of existing government structures and 
involve national, provincial, local, and community government as well as 
ministries and other institutions. Essential institutional players are ministries (such 
as the ministries of finance, health, and education), organizations (such as military 
units and civil defence), regional and local government entities, NGOs (such as 
the Red Cross), international aid and finance organizations, private sector actors, 
and local communities. The key to the success of these systems is the interaction 
between the coordinating bodies and institutional players. 
 
It is also emphasized that “It is essential to understand the values, goals, and 
objectives of the relevant stakeholders in a national system and recognize that they 
may conflict with each other. The challenge is to construct a program that is 
viewed as more desirable than the status quo for these key interested parties” 
(Freeman et al 2003). 
 
(3) Political sustainability 
A disaster management system will be politically sustainable when:  
• It is well integrated with overall development goals.  
• It is supported by legislation which provides a formal basis for preparedness, 
mitigation and recovery actions; formulates major responsibilities in legal form; 
provides protection for government (bodies), organizations and individuals in 
conducting their tasks during the process of managing disasters.  
• It is supported by continued public awareness of disaster risks, particularly during 
and through periods when there are few disaster events. 
• The actors in charge (institutions and individuals) are accountable for their 
responsibilities in different phases of disaster management.   
 
(4) Financial sustainability 
In order to function effectively, a national disaster management system should have 
financial resources for at least three major expenditures; namely, the ongoing 
operation of a national system, the implementation of mitigation measures and the 
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postdisaster reconstruction. Therefore, it is crucial to have sufficient financial 
resources; or in other words, to be financially sustainable. Two methods can be 
applied to ensure financial support for a National Disaster Management System:  
• Committing to a long-term financing contract with reinsurance companies, 
investors or international institutions. 
• Responding to pressure from the finance community. 
 
(5) Well-functioning information system 
The importance of information flows is increasingly acknowledged in the disaster 
management sector. World Disaster Report 2005 examines various aspects of 
information collection and dissemination during different phases of disaster. 
According to the report,  
 
Information is a vital form of aid in itself—but this is not sufficiently recognised 
among humanitarian organizations. Disaster-affected people need information as 
much as water, food, medicine or shelter. Information can saves lives, livelihoods, 
and resources. It may be the only form of disaster preparedness the most vulnerable 
can afford. Yet aid organizations focus mainly on gathering information for 
themselves and not enough on exchanging information with the people they aim to 
support. 
 
Information flow between aid givers and receivers during and after a disastrous event 
is, however, only a part of the information need in an emergency situation. An 
effective national disaster management system should have well-functioning 
information systems and networks before, during, and after disasters take place.  
 
According to Rego (2001: 1–2) 
 
The information needs of disaster managers fall into two distinct, but closely related, 
categories of activities: 
• Predisaster activities: analysis and research (to improve the existing knowledge base), 
risk assessment, prevention, mitigation, and preparedness; and 
• Postdisaster activities: response, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. 
 
Accordingly, there are two categories of disaster-related data: 
• Predisaster baseline data about the country and risk; and 
• Postdisaster real time data about the impact of a disaster and the resources available 
to combat it. 
 
Key elements of a disaster management information system would be a data base of: 
• Hazard assessment mapping 
• Vulnerability assessment 
• Demographic distribution 
• Infrastructure, lifelines, and critical facilities 
• Logistics and transportation routes 
• Human and material response and resources 
• Communication facilities 
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Box 3. Disaster Management Information System in the Philippines:  
An Example 
 
“The National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) is the highest policy making body in 
disaster management in the Philippines. In 2000 NDCC has started installing an Emergency 
Management Information System that will link up all their regional centres electronically and 
make available vital information to the public through the internet. The new system will have 
four components: 
1. Emergency Reporting and Monitoring 
2. Emergency Logistics Management 
3. Emergency Fund Management 
4. Geographic Information System 
 
The Advanced Geographic Information Display System has been established at the Philippines 
National Disaster Management Center in Camp Aguinaldo, Manila. It is linked to all member 
organizations of the NDCC as well as the regional offices of the cffice of civil defence which form 
the secretariat of the regional disaster coordinating councils. The integrated data base comprises 
spatial information comprising Digitized Maps, Aerial Photos, Satelite Data while the nonspatial 
data on display covers History of Disasters, Demographic Database, Response Teams and 
Directory of Key Contacts and Resources. NDCC is also assessing the existing system for early 
warning to identify areas for upgrading and enhancement.” (Rego 2001: 5–6) 
 
 
In addition, as Rego (2001: 1) stated: 
 
The ability of leaders and administrators to make sound disaster management decisions—
to analyse risks and decide upon appropriate counter measures—can be greatly enhanced 
by the cross-sectoral integration of information. For example, to understand the full short 
and long-term implication of floods and to plan accordingly requires the analysis of 
combined data on meteorology, topography, soil characteristics, vegetation, hydrology, 
settlements, infrastructure, transportation, population, socioeconomics and material 
resources. This information comes from many different sources and at present it is difficult 
in most countries to bring it all together. 
 
 
9. DISASTER MANAGEMENT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL  
 
Although the social, economic, political, and emotional impacts of major disasters can be 
nation-wide, disastrous events are mostly local in their impact. Indonesia certainly was 
“hurt” by the tsunami in December 2004, but the actual devastating event happened in 
the province of Aceh, where most major disaster response and recovery activities took 
place. Consequently, the locality of the emergency and the ways to deal with it are 
unavoidable and crucial.  
 
Many countries have designed their disaster management systems at national level, 
however, there is a growing awareness that comprehensive disaster management systems 
should not only depend on central authorities. The system should be strengthened by 
integrated involvement of local actors and capacities (knowledge, expertise, resources, 
networks, etc.). In many cases, local communities have organized committees to respond 
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to emergencies because—in the first place—people rely on themselves and their 
community to survive. “It has been estimated that no more than 10 percent of survival in 
emergencies can be attributed to external sources of relief aid” (Hilhorst 2004: 62). With 
regard to this, it is important to examine the necessities and possibilities of increasing the 
involvement and participation of local actors in the national effort to manage disasters. 
 
9.1 Local Knowledge 
 
Recognition of the important role of local actors and capacities in coping with 
emergencies leads us to the issues of local knowledge. Studies (Bankoff 2003; Blaikie et al 
1994) shows that people—especially those who inhabit disaster-prone areas—have 
developed extensive knowledge and practices on how to cope with disasters. This type of 
knowledge and practices are often labelled as “local” (and thus, regarded as different from 
the nonlocal, modern scientific knowledge). For some researchers and practitioners, local 
knowledge is information stock that can be of use for disaster management. For some 
others, local knowledge is regarded more as a source of political and economic 
empowerment of local/affected people. There is something true in both views; a 
comprehensive disaster management plan should have the flexibility to adopt knowledge 
and practices developed by communities at risk, especially if the involvement of the local 
community is considered important. 
 
9.2 The Potential Local Actors 
 
For a comprehensive Disaster Management System, the involvement of a wide range of 
local actors is needed. These actors are:  
• Local government and its administration units. 
• The community: affected population or population at risk, community leaders, 
community-based organizations. 
• Local representatives of different sectors, both the public administration (e.g., health, 
education, transport, environment, and public works) and the private sector 
(technical and educational institutes, firms, the media). 
• Local emergency response organization (e.g., emergency committees, fire-fighters, 
Red Cross, brigades, NGOs, etc.) (Bollin et al 2003). 
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Box 4. Construction of Local Disaster Management in the Philippines: 
An Example 
 
“In the 1970s, policy principles were established to encourage each local government to take 
responsibility for its own security with respect to disaster response and the assignment of function 
to all public agencies at different government levels. Presidential Decree 1566 of 1978 set the 
basis of the disaster response organization and of the National Plan for Community Preparedness.  
 
Structurally, the executive branch of government at each level is responsible for the different 
activities related to prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and reconstruction. The 
national government has the function of supporting local governments in cases of emergency. 
Each state agency must use its own resources to fulfil its responsibilities in its area of authority 
and to support the localities. Although this is very new and has weaknesses, the localities must 
include resources in their annual budgets for mitigation and preparedness activities. However, by 
law each locality must also earmark 5% of its regular resources each year for the Local Calamity 
Fund, which has the exclusive goal of responding to postdisaster situations that arise in its 
territory. The Local Funds are managed by the local governments. In addition, they are subsidized 
by the central government through the National Calamity Fund. 
 
The National Plan establishes the mechanisms of coordination and horizontal and vertical 
integration between the various state agencies at the different levels and the private sector and 
civil society. At each territorial level, there is a Disaster Coordination Council, presided over by 
the respective head of the territorial government, with the objective of advising that government 
and guaranteeing institutional coordination. 
 
In the local environment, civil society organizations participate in the planning processes and in 
operational aspects. Many local projects are carried out by community organizations or by NGOs. 
Economic protection measures, such as insurance, have been delegated to the private sector and 
NGOs, and structural mitigation measures are the responsibility of engineering and architectural 
organizations.” (Bollin et al 2003: 10) 
 
 
 
 
 
Each of these potential actors has different expertises, functions, resources, 
responsibilities, and interests. The crucial thing, therefore, will be to coordinate them in 
order to achieve common goals. The specificity of each actor should be carefully 
considered because it is the basis for determining function and assigning tasks of 
particular actors in disaster management. Nevertheless, the potential local actors do not 
always have the motivation to participate in disaster management. A combination of 
incentives provision, public awareness campaign, provision of technical assistance, and 
supervision might help to increase interest.  
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10. DISASTER MANAGEMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL: THE 
CASE OF ASEAN 
 
The Southeast Asia region has been exposed to different kinds of hazards for centuries. 
Communities in this region have a long history of coping with these hazards. Floods are 
the major hazard in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Vietnam during the monsoon season. 
Indonesia and the Philippines are situated in the Pacific Ring of Fire and are periodically 
hit by earthquakes and volcano eruptions. Over the past twenty years, natural and man-
made disasters in the Southeast Asian countries have been more and more influenced by 
social processes such as rapid urbanization, demographic changes, and intensification of 
human activities in many aspects. The calamities have a great impact in terms of 
casualties, economic loss and disturbed activities. In many cases, the afflicted country 
could not deal with the disastrous situation on its own. Disaster occurrences urge 
international solidarity and cooperation, therefore disaster management at the 
international level is often inseparable from similar efforts at the national and local level. 
This is especially the case in a disaster-prone region such as Southeast Asia. 
 
10.1 The ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM) 
 
In 1971 disaster management experts in the ASEAN Region formed the ASEAN Expert 
Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM) and met every two years. Five years later, the 
issue of regional cooperation in the field of disaster management was adopted as one of 
ASEAN’s objectives and principles stipulated in the declaration of ASEAN Concord-1. 
This was further operationalized into the ASEAN Declaration on Mutual Assistance on 
Natural Disaster in June 1976. 
 
The 12
th
 Meeting of the ASEAN Expert Group on Disaster Management (AEGDM), 
held on 16–18 September 2002 in Hanoi, Vietnam, agreed to restructure the AEGDM 
into an ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM). To intensify ASEAN 
cooperation in disaster management, the Committee also decided to meet annually 
instead of once every two years. In the process, the ACDM has also been supported by 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
 
The members of ACDM are: 
1) Brunei Darussalam Fire Services Department 
2) Cambodia National Committee for Disaster Management 
3) Indonesia National Coordination Board for Natural Disaster Management 
4) Lao PDR National Disaster Management Office 
5) Myanmar Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement 
6) Philippines National Coordinating Council 
7) Malaysia National Security Division 
8) Singapore Civil Defence Force 
9) Vietnam Dyke Management  
 
The ACDM has a wide range of activities that cover various disaster management 
components (mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery, and rehabilitation). These 
activities are among others: 
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• Exchanging views on strategic and emerging issues involving disaster management 
and relief activities in the ASEAN Region. 
• Formulating and implementing the ASEAN Regional Program on Disaster 
Management (ARPDM) that outlines regional strategies, priority areas, and activities 
on disaster management. 
• Providing assistance in securing financial support and seeking funding for ASEAN 
activities in disaster management. 
• Promoting the sharing of information and resources on disaster management. 
• Collaborating with ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners; regional, international, and 
multilateral agencies; NGOs and the private sector in advancing the objectives of 
ASEAN cooperation in disaster management. 
• Strengthening capacities in the areas of priority concern and in accordance with the 
needs of member countries. 
• Advancing the active involvement and participation of various stakeholders in 
disaster management including the UN agencies, international organizations, NGOs, 
and communities. 
• Facilitating the coordination and distribution of medical supplies, services, and relief 
assistance when needed. 
• Promoting effective integration of programmes and activities with other relevant 
ASEAN bodies. 
• Supporting advocacy, public education, and awareness programs. 
• Providing advice to the ASEAN Standing Committee on matters relating to disaster 
management. 
 
These activities focus on the following various categories of disasters: 
• Natural Disasters such as earthquake, aftershock, flood, flash flood, dam collapse, 
heat wave, typhoons, storms, hailstorm surges, thunderstorm, tropical storm, 
insect/animal infestation, landslide, tidal wave (tsunami), volcanic eruption, etcetera. 
• Man-made disasters such as structural collapse, mine collapse or cave-in, air disasters, 
industrial technology accident, chemical, nuclear, mine and other types of 
explosions, pollution, acid rain, chemical, atmospheric and oil pollution as well as 
various types of fires (for example forest/grassland fires), etcetera. 
 
10.2 The ASEAN Regional Programme on Disaster Management (ARPDM) 
 
Additionally, in the Hanoi meeting, the ASEAN Regional Program on Disaster 
Management (ARPDM) was endorsed. This program was formulated with the assistance 
of the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC).
3
  
 
The ARPDM is a comprehensive program that would help ASEAN anticipate and 
forecast possible disasters, improve the readiness of the region in terms of disaster 
awareness and response preparedness, and plan to mitigate hazard impacts. The program 
has five objectives, namely 
                                               
3
Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) is a nonprofit organization supporting the advancement of 
safer communities and sustainable development, through implementing programs and projects that reduce 
the impact of disasters upon countries and communities in Asia and the Pacific. ADPC is based in 
Bangkok, Thailand. 
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• Establishing cooperation among Member Countries (in the forms of joint projects, 
collaborative research, and networking). 
• Strengthening capacity building in areas of priority concern of member countries and 
to promote human resources development in disaster management in accordance 
with the needs of member countries. 
• Sharing of information, expertise, best practices, and resources. 
• Engaging external partnerships (government organizations, NGOs, community and 
international organizations). 
• Promoting advocacy, public education, and awareness programs related to disaster 
management. 
 
Not every country will be involved in every project as a precondition for its inclusion in 
the ARPDM. Some projects may involve only certain countries that are close in 
proximity or affected by common hazards. In addition, programs at the national level 
would be opened up for participation by other ASEAN Member Countries. 
 
 
11. RESPONDING AND MANAGING DISASTER IN DIFFERENT 
COUNTRIES: WHAT ARE THE LESSONS LEARNED? 
 
In previous subsections, we learn about components of disaster management and 
important issues related to the application of disaster management at different level. In 
this subsection, the application will be examined in a specific context of disaster 
occurrence in four countries namely, the Philippines, the United States, the 
Netherlands, and Indonesia.  
 
11.1 The Philippines 
 
The Disaster Management System 
 
The National Civil Defence Administration, which was founded in 1954, is a formal 
government organization to provide basic assistance in times of national emergency in 
the Philippines. Subsequently, various institutions were established to provide early 
warning of impending hazards and to coordinate different government institutions in 
time of calamities. In 1970, the Office of the President established an interdepartmental 
planning group to coordinate various efforts related to disaster management and to 
construct a comprehensive relief structure at all levels of government, from the national 
to the municipal level. The planning group is called the Calamities and Disaster 
Preparedness Plan (CDPP).  
 
Once disaster has occurred or in the process of occurring, the principal body charged 
with disaster management under the provisions of the CDPP is the National Disaster 
Coordinating Council (NDCC) established in 1978 by Presidential Decree No. 1566. Its 
membership is primarily composed of the chief executives of those 14 government 
departments most involved in handling emergency situations together with 
representatives from the Office of the President, the Armed Forces, and the Philippine 
National Red Cross. The Administrator of the Office of Civil Defence (OCD) 
constitutes its executive officer and that agency assumes the main coordinating role for 
all disaster-related activities. The NDCC has wide-ranging powers and duties including 
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the decision to declare a state of calamity in any area of the country and to evaluate the 
stand-by resources in localities to be used for emergency relief. It generally adopts a 
‘multi-hazard, multi-agency’ approach to emergency management: liaising with the 
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the Philippine National 
Red Cross (PNRC) to provide immediate welfare services such as food, housing and 
clothing; with the Department of Health about measures to prevent or control the 
outbreak of disease; and with local government units (LGUs) established a network of 
disaster coordinating councils that can be activated in emergency situations all the way 
down to the municipal level. The emphasis is on the development of self-reliance 
among LGUs whose officers-in-charge are mandated to organise disaster operation 
centres. In reality, though, relatively few of these bodies have prescribed contingency 
plans or operational procedures beyond the simple doling out of relief goods… (Bankoff 
2003: 85) 
 
The huge costs of disaster management measures (prevention, relief, response and 
rehabilitation) are met by putting a specific amount of money annually into a Calamity 
Fund. In times of emergency, the NDCC will request the Office of the President to 
provide required sums from this fund. During the period of 1985 to 1991:  
 
In all, a total of P14.4 billion (US$576 million) was set aside in the national budgets for 
disaster management …when losses to agriculture and infrastructure alone amounted to 
P58.18 (US$2.33 billion) and preventative measures, especially the diversion of lava 
flows, ran into many billion more. Local government is also expected to reserve 2 per 
cent, later increased to 5 per cent of their annual budget for disaster preparedness… 
(Bankoff 2003: 86–87) 
 
Lessons Learned from Eruption of Mount Pinatubo: Experiences in Evacuation Centers 
 
The Philippines is particularly exposed to various natural hazards such as typhoons, 
floods, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions.  
 
In June 1991, the second largest volcanic eruption of the twentieth century took place 
on the island of Luzon in the Philippines, a mere 90 kilometers (55 miles) northwest of 
the capital city Manila. Up to 800 people were killed and 100,000 became homeless 
following the eruptions, which climaxed with nine hours of eruption on June 15, 1991 
… The human impacts of the disaster are staggering. In addition to the up to 800 people 
who lost their lives, there was almost one half of a billion dollars in property and 
economic damage. The economy of central Luzon was horribly disrupted. In 1991, the 
volcano destroyed 4,979 homes and damaged another 70,257. (Rosenberg 2001: n.p.)  
 
Although there were evacuees who could be taken into the homes of relatives or friends, 
a substantial number of those who fled the volcanic eruption had to be sheltered in 
evacuation centers and later in makeshift houses. 
 
Jimenez (1993) studied stress and coping in evacuation centers in the town of 
Conception after the 1991 Mt Pinatubo eruption. This study showed that rebuilding 
daily life in evacuation centers is a complex process both for the evacuees as well as for 
the service providers. Many of the evacuation centers were school rooms. Initially, one 
room was limited to housing eight families. But relatives, friends or people from the same 
neighborhood often preferred to stay together. Mostly, the evacuees did not complain 
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about the overcrowding, but they had difficulty in getting a good night’s sleep because of 
the constant noise, various smells, and movement of others in the room.  
 
Many of the centers were provided with electricity and water pumps, only a few had 
bathrooms and toilets. Maintaining cleanliness was, therefore, one of the problems in the 
centers.  
 
Committees were created to ensure cleanliness in the rooms, corridors, and grounds of 
the centers. The evacuees were constantly reminded to keep their surroundings clean 
through daily inspection by the principals or volunteers teachers, daily exhortations or 
reprimands over the sound system. Once a week, the rooms were also sprayed with insect 
repellants. The women admitted that the centers were cleaner because of the constant 
supervision of the teacher. (Jimenez 1993: 136) 
 
Organizations among the evacuees were also established in the centers. The evacuees 
made a differentiation between center leaders (over-all leader and room leaders) and the 
political leaders (councilors, heads of the neighborhood, etc.). There were also various 
committees in the centers but the most familiar one is the committee dealing with 
cleanliness of the centers.  
 
The goods they received were one of the important issues among the evacuees.  
 
… they compared the contents of the various packages (designated only by numbers) and 
identified their favorites. … In general, they agreed that the Red Cross gave more rice 
while the DSWD [Department of Social Work and Development – RM] had more 
plentiful viands, although they also recalled a time during the early days when the 
DSWD was generous with its rice allocation. The Red Cross allotted the same amount to 
every family, regardless of size, thus benefiting the smaller families. On the other hand, 
the DSWD gave an amount of goods which was proportionate to the family size … With 
the passage of time, the evacuees worried about the significant decrease in donations 
from NGOs and concerned individuals, leaving them virtually dependent on the 
allocations from the DSWD or the Red Cross. They voiced their apprehensions that 
distribution would eventually end. (Jimenez 1993: 138) 
 
It is important to note that a clear pattern of day-to-day activities was soon established 
among the evacuees in the centers.  
 
As more time elapsed the men continued to leave the center every morning to search 
for jobs or to simply pass the time in their old barangays. The jobs they found in town 
included vending ice candy, buying and selling old bottles. Beyond the town or in other 
provinces, they could find short-term work contracts. In the mean time, the women 
cooked the meals, did the laundry, cleaned and looked after children. Many took 
laundry for pay, tended small sari-sari stores or sold cooked food within the centers … 
the children were integrated into the ongoing classes in town or the temporary classes 
established in their centers. It was the older children in high school and college whose 
studies suffered as their parents could no longer afford to send them to school. (Jimenez, 
1993: 139)  
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It is reported that, in general, the evacuees did develop daily routines in the centers. But 
this was very different from their lives in their villages and neighborhoods. Despite the 
routine, evacuees complained that they did not have enough to do. Receiving relief 
goods was one of the few high points of daily life in the evacuation centers.   
 
11.2 The United States 
 
The Disaster Management System 
 
The United States has comprehensive programs at the national level to manage disasters. 
In general, the major stakeholders to manage disaster in the United States are as follows:  
• State and local governments  
• Risk transfer instrument capital market for catastrophic loss protection 
• Federal government agencies, including The Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA)  
• Primary insurance companies  
• Financial institutions 
• Building sector 
 
Nevertheless, in emergency situations, FEMA is responsible for the centralization and co-
ordination of various disaster management components at the national level. FEMA is, 
therefore, one of the key institutions of disaster management in the US.  
 
With the increase in prosperity and the standard of living in the US during the 1960s 
and 1970s, the impact of natural disasters was regarded as more burdensome. It was felt 
that the federal government should play a stronger and more coordinating role. Although 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development had an agency for disaster response 
and relief, more than 100 federal agencies also had responsibilities related to disaster 
assistance. The federal government therefore needed to play a stronger and coordinating 
role. The 1968 National Flood Insurance Act and the 1974 Disaster Relief Act have 
given a more important role to the federal government. In 1979, an Executive Order 
from President Jimmy Carter merged various separate disaster-related responsibilities and 
tasks into FEMA. This association included: 
• The Federal Insurance Administration 
• The National Fire Prevention and Control Administration 
• The National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program 
• The Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration 
• The Federal Disaster Administration Activities from the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development. 
 
In addition to its centralizing and coordinating tasks, FEMA has developed HAZUS, a 
multihazard tool with models for estimating potential losses from earthquake, wind, and 
flood hazards.  
 
Besides the comprehensive programs to manage disasters, in the US there are loss-sharing 
programs that involve government and private market institutions. These programs are 
public/private insurance systems to finance recovery. The National Flood Insurance Program 
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(NFIP), for example, is based on insurance policies offered by the private sector, but the 
national government assumes the risks and automatically plays the role of reinsurer. 
 
Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina: Powerful Country, Weak Disaster Response?  
 
Unlike the tsunami in Aceh or the earthquake in Pakistan, Hurricane Katrina that hit 
New Orleans in August 2005 was a predicted natural hazard. Before Katrina arrived, the 
National Hurricane Center in Miami had predicted several other hurricanes that arrived 
in the same season: Arlene, Bret, Cindy, Dennis, etcetera. Experts even said that 
Hurricane Ivan, which also hit the same areas in September 2004 as a Category 4 storm, 
was a “wake-up call” for New Orleans. Nevertheless, the world witnessed disturbing 
images of completely devastated New Orleans and heated discussions on how and why 
the US was not as prepared as it could have been. Widespread looting, hungry refugees, 
corpses left on the street to decompose were regarded as “third world phenomena” in 
disaster situations, but this happened in New Orleans, in the US.  
 
The disaster management practitioners of New Orleans saw how Katrina was 
approaching the city. Three days before the hurricane hit New Orleans, the Governor of 
Louisiana declared a state of emergency so that measures such as compulsory evacuation 
could be done easier. Nevertheless, concrete measures had not been taken yet. The 
Mayor of New Orleans, Ray Nagin, decided to announce an evacuation only 38 hours 
before Katrina came, while according to the guidelines of Louisiana State, evacuation 
should be decided 50 hours before a hurricane arrives. He urged the inhabitants of New 
Orleans to undertake the evacuation voluntarily. One day before the disastrous event 
occurred, when it was clear that Katrina would be a Category 4 or 5 storm, Mayor Nagin 
declared a compulsory evacuation. Most residents did leave the city. For those who 
decided to stay or were not able to leave the city, there were public shelters available 
including the Superdome football stadium. By Monday, 29 August 2005, Katrina made 
landfall as a Category 4 storm. One day later, 75 per cent of New Orleans was flooded, 
with some parts of the city under 6 meters of water. The devastating flood was especially 
caused by several levee breaches. Hurricane Katrina was catastrophic and the US was 
shocked by one of the deadliest natural disasters in the country’s history. 
 
There are critics on the way disaster management-related institutions responded to 
Hurricane Katrina. There was even mention of “Katrinagate” which would have a 
negative impact on the Bush Administration. Besides the fact that the evacuation 
announcement was rather late, the decision to enforce an evacuation was undermined in 
two ways:  
 
First, no provision appears to have been made for those without private transport and 
without resources. The flood of buses that came in to relocate who took shelter in public 
arenas should have come in before Katrina not after it. Second, the announcement that 
public shelters were available made the message to leave seem less convincing. People 
search for some way to discount a warning. (Scanlon 2005: n.p.) 
 
The ways authorities handled the “looting” in New Orleans after the disaster occurred 
was also criticized:  
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The problem in New Orleans, of course, was that those who survived often did not have 
the capacity to do what needed to be done. Many were trapped in their homes unable to 
help themselves let alone help others. Most—including those who sheltered in public 
facilities— were soon short of water, food, clothing and sanitary facilities. It was urgent 
that there be:  a) a massive relief effort and b) a massive search and rescue effort to find 
those who were trapped and to help them … some of those who survived did do what 
they could to help themselves. Given their desperate need for liquid they found sources 
for fresh water and, where necessary, did what was needed to get that water. If that 
involved breaking into a store, that is what they did. They did the same thing when 
they needed food or diapers or fresh clothing. If the authorities wanted to prevent this 
they had the two options described above. They would have got the people out or they 
could have brought supplies in. Sadly, the authorities choose to view the situation in 
New Orleans after Katrina not as one involving desperate people urgently in need of 
assistance but as a situation requiring law and order. So the police—though reluctant at 
first—began to crack down on what they were being told was “looting” and the military 
arrived with a show of force. (Scanlon 2005)  
 
Inadequate available public shelter is another point of criticism. The Superdome football 
stadium for example, did not meet the international standards as an evacuation center.  
 
FEMA was seen as less than able to handle the emergency situation in New Orleans. 
Disaster management practitioners of the city complained that FEMA was not able to 
lead and coordinate the relief operation, although the agency had been in the disaster 
site for three days. Since its establishment during the Carter administration in 1979, this 
agency has faced various constraints, “It has been an agency torn by turf fights along 
program lines, overburdened with political appointees, … and perceived of by other 
agencies as claiming more power to coordinate the rest of the government than it had 
muscle or capability” (Perrow 2005: n.p.). The “poor” performance of FEMA in the 
Katrina disaster is also associated with the fact that since 2001 FEMA has undergone 
financial cuts to its disaster mitigation projects and that, in 2002, this agency was moved 
to the Department of Homeland Security with the priority of fighting terrorism. The 
National Guard troops that are supposed to support FEMA in relief operations had to 
come from all over the country. Officially, thousands of National Guard troops were 
stationed in Louisiana and Mississippi but most of them were in Iraq (NRC Handelsblad 
3 September 2005). 
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Table 2. Katrina and Measures Taken by the Government: 
A Week-Long Overview 
Date Situations/ happenings related to 
Katrina 
Measures taken  
in New Orleans 
Friday 
August 26 
Katrina was approaching the Gulf 
of Mexico as a Category 3 storm.  
- The Governor of Louisiana 
announced emergency situation. 
- Mayor Nagin said that he was aware 
about the limited time for preparation, 
but he urged the inhabitants of New 
Orleans to prepare themselves for the 
hurricane. 
Saturday 
August 27 
The Hurricane Center warned 
that Katrina would reach the coast 
within 24 hours as a Category 4 
storm. 
- Mayor Nagin announced the 
voluntary evacuation. 
- President Bush declared Katrina an 
emergency situation and provided 
federal support to FEMA. 
Sunday 
August 28 
The Hurricane Center urged that 
measures to protect human life 
and property should be finished as 
soon as possible. The Center also 
warned that waves of more than 6 
meteres could occur. 
- Mayor Nagin called compulsory 
evacuation and announced there were 
public shelters available for those who 
decided to stay or were unable to leave 
the city. 
- President Bush categorized Katrina as 
a major disaster and decided to make 
extra funds available to help. 
Monday 
August 29 
Katrina struck New Orleans and 
most parts of the city were flooded. 
- FEMA asked city authorities what 
kinds of help and assistance they 
needed. 
- The evacuees were not allowed to 
return to their homes for two days.  
Tuesday 
August 30 
Two levees broke, the “looting” 
started, hundreds of deaths were 
predicted. It was clear that people 
would need shelter for months. 
- 7,500 National Guard troops were 
mobilized. 
- FEMA started to send medical teams, 
rescue helicopters and rescue boats. 
Wednesday 
August 31 
The casualties were expected to 
number in the thousands.  
- The Pentagon sent extra rescue 
helicopters, military, food, and boats. 
Thursday 
September 1 
Relief workers found thousands of 
people still trapped in New 
Orleans Convention Center amid 
mounds of trash and human waste.  
- The first food drops. 
- The Governor of Louisiana gave 
permission to the military to shoot 
people involved in looting.  
- Bush provided US$10.5 billion of 
relief funds. 
Friday 
September 2 
The flood was slowly decreasing. - President Bush admitted that the 
quality of first emergency relief was 
“unacceptable”. 
 
Source: NRC Handelsblad, 3 September 2005. 
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11.3 Indonesia 
 
Disaster Profile 
 
Indonesia is well-known as an active tectonic region and it is located at the intersection 
of three tectonic plates, namely, (1) Eurasian plate in the north, (2) Australian-Indian 
plate in the south, and (3) Pacific plate in the east. 
 
The plate movement generates convergent boundaries which form subduction zones. 
These zones are notorious for producing disastrous earthquakes because of intense 
geological activity. If these earthquakes occur under the ocean they can create tsunamis, 
such as the earthquake caused by subduction of the Indo-Australian Plate under the 
Eurasian Plate on 26 December 2004, that caused devastation in the areas around the 
Indian Ocean. 
 
In addition, there are more than 500 volcanoes in Indonesia, 128 of which are active. 
This represents some 15% of the active volcanoes in the world. The most active volcano 
in Indonesia is Merapi, which is situated 20 kilometers to the north of Yogyakarta. This 
volcano has been observed continuously by means of telemetric equipment as well as 
field observation. Thus, volcanic eruption disasters can be mitigated very well. Many 
others are also closely monitored in order to minimize the impact of volcanic eruptions.  
 
Other natural disasters which are generated or exacerbated by human activities are 
floods, landslides, drought, land/forest fires. These are believed to result from land or 
environmental degradation. In the monsoon season, Indonesia is threatened by floods 
and/or landslides and in the dry season (April–September), the country periodically has 
to face drought and various fires (forest, land, urban/building). Drought also can affect 
hydro-power supply due to significantly less water in many reservoirs. 
 
Besides natural disasters, Indonesia, as an ethnically, religiously, and culturally-diverse 
nation, is also vulnerable to man-made and armed-conflict related disasters (ADRC 
2004). 
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Table 3. Disaster Occurrences in 2002–2004 
 
Victims  
 
No. 
 
 
Type of  Disaster 
 
Number of 
Occurrences 
Number of 
Deaths 
Number of 
Evacuees/ 
Refugees 
 
Economic Loss 
(Rupiah) 
 
Property 
Damage 
(Unit) 
2002 
1 Environmental 
Pollution 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 Fire 2 0 0 15,000,000 1 
3 Social Conflict 19 258 2,000 0 0 
4 Epidemic 2 29 0 0 0 
5 Technological failures 1 1 0 0 0 
6 Forest fire 3 0 0 0 0 
7 Volcanic eruption  12 2 210,005 0 5 
8 Tsunami 0 0 0 0 0 
9 Earthquake 8 4 700 0 242 
10 Typhoon 10 4 0 1,398,950,000 219 
2003 
1 Environmental 
Pollution 
0 0 0 0 0 
2 Fire 68 3 176 2,882,422,000 189 
3 Social Conflict 0 0 0 0 0 
4 Epidemic 1 24 0 0 0 
5 Technological failures 0 0 0 0 0 
6 Forest fire 0 0 0 0 0 
7 Volcanic eruption  6 0 1,289 0 0 
8 Tsunami 0 0 0 0 0 
9 Earthquake 9 0 2,127 0 542 
10 Typhoon 26 6 727 16,335,450,000 339 
2004 
1 Environmental 
Pollution 
0 0 0 0 0 
2 Fire 87 18 9,503 158,140,000,000 1,797 
3 Social Conflict 5 52 11,585 33,000,000,000 400 
4 Epidemic 19 251 0 0 0 
5 Technological failures 1 4 0 0 0 
6 Forest fire 9 0 0 0 0 
7 Volcanic eruption  3 2 13,331 0 0 
8 Tsunami 17 22,170 500 1,033,900,000 278 
9 Earthquake 19 7,334 6,177 797,332,000,000 13,066 
10 Typhoon 67 5,013 2,175 62,311,700,142 6,007 
(Source: Bakornas PBP, www.bakornaspbp.go.id ) 
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The Disaster Management System 
 
The government body that is responsible for formulating policies and coordination of 
programs and activities in the field of disaster management in Indonesia is the Bakornas 
PBP (Badan Koordinasi Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana dan Penanganan 
Pengungsi/The National Coordination Board for Disaster Management). This is a 
nonstructural body established under the Abdurrahman Wahid administration, based on 
Presidential Decree No. 3 of 2001
4
 and reports directly to the President of Indonesia. It is 
composed of: 
1) Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia (Chairman) 
2) Coordinating Minister for Peoples Welfare (Vice-chairman) 
3) Minister of Internal Affairs (Member) 
4) Minister of Social Affairs (Member) 
5) Minister of Health (Member) 
6) Minister of Public Works (Member) 
7) Minister of Transportation (Member) 
8) Minister of Finance (Member) 
9) Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Member) 
10) Head of National Police (Member) 
11) Secretary of Vice President (Secretary) 
 
The Bakornas PBP has three following main functions: 
1) Formulating and deciding national disaster management policies and strategies. 
2) Coordinating the implementation of disaster management activities before, during, 
and after disaster occurrence. 
3) Providing guidance and supervision on efforts related to disaster management 
(preparedness, mitigation, response, rehabilitation, and reconstruction) and the 
handling of refugees. 
 
In performing its functions, the Bakornas PBP is assisted by a secretarial body which has 
four deputies: Disaster Management, Internally Displaced Persons Management, 
Cooperation and People Participation, and Administration. The Bakornas PBP, which 
operates at the national level, is also supported by other bodies at the provincial level 
(satuan koordinasi pelaksana or satkorlak PBP) and at the district/municipal level (satuan 
pelaksana: satlak PBP). When a disaster occurs, reports from different parties (community 
leaders, including the head of the subdistrict (camat) disaster monitoring teams, will be 
first given to and handled by the satlak PBP. This means, the quality of disaster 
management (measures and staffs) at the district/municipal level can be crucial to the 
whole operation.  
 
The main financial source of Bakornas PBP is from the national budget (APBN), while 
the satkorlak and satlak will be financed by the regional budget (Provincial APBD and 
APBD Kabupaten/Kota).  
 
 
 
                                               
4
This decree has been revised by the Presidential Decree No. 111/2001. 
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Information Systems and Networks  
 
The Indonesian Disaster Management Information System (SIPBI) was developed by 
Bakornas PBP through the UNDP funded project on Strengthening Disaster 
Management In Indonesia. This information system has two aims; first, enhancing 
Bakornas PBP’s decision-making capability and, second, increasing and ensuring the flow 
of reliable and up-to-date information on various disaster events requiring a disaster 
response. The scope of SIPBI components includes: 
• The development of computer networking systems. 
• The development of a database for disaster management. 
• The development of Geographic Information System (GIS) for disaster management. 
The GIS component aims at developing risk maps at the national, provincial, and 
district level. 
 
Under this project, SIPBI also develops a number of modules on forest fires, earthquake, 
tsunami, volcanic eruption, and social unrest (Rego 2001). 
 
A nongovernmental organization that also works on information system and networks in 
the field of urban disaster management is Kompak. This forum, which is based in the 
Institute of Technology, Bandung, aims to consolidate various mitigation organizations, 
research institutes, and community based organizations in order to acquire a basis for 
common understanding and implementation of sustainable urban disaster mitigation. 
Additionally, Kompak also aims to enhance public awareness and preparedness through 
information dissemination, and building public and private networks. Kompak develops 
an internet based communication network and has a newsletter as the communication 
instrument among its members. The internet has two components: an intranet and 
extranet. The intranet can only be accessed by the members of Kompak and individuals 
in Bandung, while the extranet is accessible to the wider public (Rego 2001). 
 
Other Indonesian (governmental and nongovernmental) institutions, which also have 
research programs and conduct activities in the field of disaster mitigation, include: 
• Indonesian Society for Disaster Mitigation (Jakarta) 
• Indonesian Forum for the Environment/Walhi  
• UGM Center for Natural Disaster Studies (Yogyakarta)  
• Indonesian Red Cross  
• Indonesian Meteorological and Geophysical Agency (Jakarta) 
• Directorate of Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation (Bandung) 
• Indonesian Association of Geologists 
 
Lessons Learned From the Tsunami in Aceh: The Problems of Coordination 
 
The tsunami which devastated Aceh on 26 December 2004 left 164,000 people dead 
or missing and over 400,000 homeless. It rapidly became the most reported disaster 
in history as well as the most well-funded disaster response. Over 200 humanitarian 
organizations—plus 3,000 military troops from a dozen countries—arrived to offer 
aid. 
 
Local people came to each others’ assistance first, despite enormous difficulties. Red 
Cross volunteers, helped by the army, removed bodies and distributed food and 
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water. Aid organizations familiar with the terrain—including Indonesian NGOs and 
the Red Cross—had the benefit of local knowledge. Even so, their baseline data was 
incomplete, while the government’s information was considered outdated. 
 
Neighboring countries were quick to respond. Language and culture proved no 
obstacle to their teams, which swiftly grasped the immediate need. Yet many 
international agencies brought in staff from Europe or America, when they could 
have exploited regional expertise. 
 
Although international agencies were right in guessing that water, food, and shelter 
would be survivors’ initial needs, they were wrong to assume these needs would not 
be covered, at least partially, by Indonesians themselves. Agencies did little to 
suppress the myth of disaster victims dependent on external aid to survive. 
 
Collaboration between Indonesian and foreign troops was excellent, but less than 
good between the military and civilians. Initially, there were no civil-military 
coordination experts to persuade the military to share information or take aid 
workers on flights to assess needs. Nevertheless, most agreed that without the 
military, this would have been a major crisis. 
 
As dramatic stories of suffering hit the headlines, more agencies poured in, expecting 
the worst. But aid workers arriving at Meulaboh, dubbed ‘ground zero’ of the western 
coast, on 4 January were surprised to find survivors being well cared for by the 
Indonesian army and authorities. A scramble for beneficiaries began. Some agencies 
jealously guarded their information to ensure their ‘niche’. Within weeks, the 
‘humanitarian space’ had become too small for all these actors. Coordination became 
difficult. Out of 2,000 agencies present in late January, only 46 submitted reports to 
UN coordinators. Joint needs assessments were rare. Language proved problematic, 
with UN meetings held in English and government meetings in Indonesian. 
Without knowing who was doing what and where, some communities were 
overwhelmed with aid while others were neglected. 
 
At the root of coordination problems was one key factor: too much money. Nearly 
everyone could hire a helicopter or boat, make their own needs assessment and 
distributions, and ‘fly the flag’. The classic situation, in which NGOs queue to 
become implementing partners of the UN, was reversed. 
 
The highly ‘visible’ health sector attracted the most agencies: 22 health NGOs were 
operating in one area on the west coast. Ten international field hospitals were set up 
in Banda Aceh, none of which worked at full capacity. There were too many 
surgeons. One UN witness in Meulaboh saw “20 surgeons competing for a single 
patient”. Yet midwives and nurses were in short supply. Women had to give birth 
without medical assistance, “an unacceptable risk,” according to the UN.  
 
For their needs assessments and aid distribution, most international agencies went 
through village heads. But a few organizations – concerned that local structures were 
too patriarchal – deployed female workers to assess women’s specific needs. Out of 
earshot of men, Acehnese women asked for underwear, headscarves, sanitary 
protection, and the contraceptive pill, as well as complaining about sexual 
harassment (WDR 2005). 
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